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Regulating Hedge Funds
Dale A. Oesterle*
Pressure is mounting to control hedge funds, managed
pools of private money that use very sophisticated trading
strategies in securities, currencies, and derivatives. The
industry's size - hedge funds contain over $1.5 trillion'
and the impact of the funds' trading strategies on securities
markets2 and on company operations3 has prompted
regulators around the world to investigate the industry.
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently
promulgated a limited package of new rules, effective on
February 1 of this year.4 More regulation may be coming.5
Congress has held hearings on hedge funds to see if the
SEC rules are sufficient. 6 Governments in Britain, France,
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Michael Steinhadt, Do You Really Need a Hedge Fund?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2006,
at A16 (noting a gulf between hedge fund performance and fund manager
compensation).
2 Robert C. Pozen, Hedge Funds Today: To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June 20,
2005, at A14 (suggesting a collapse of highly leveraged hedge funds may threaten the
integrity of other financial institutions; hedge funds may play an aggressive role in
campaigning for an overhaul of corporate governance).31id.
4 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
5 Kara Scannell, Hundreds of Hedge-FundAdvisers Register With SEC, WALL ST. J.,
Jan 28, 2006, at A3. See also Rita Raagas de Ramos, Concerns Over Hedge Funds Rise
as Market Volatility Rises Globally, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2006, at C5 (Some financial
experts believe that more regulation of hedge funds is needed to achieve financial
stability. Mark Shipman, a partner at Clifford Chance, argues that a universal system of
hedge fund regulation is necessary because hedge funds invest in global markets and are
available globally. Peter Douglas, head of Alternative Investment Management
Association in Singapore, suggests that current hedge fund regulation is virtually
irrelevant because most hedge funds are located offshore in completely unregulated
jurisdictions. He argues that marketing regulation would be a more effective way of
protecting nonprofessional investors from hedge funds.).
6 See, e.g., Hedge Funds and Capital Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006)
(Statement by Randal K. Quarles, Under Sec, for Domestic Finance) (stating that the
Treasury Department will examine in detail whether the growth of hedge funds holds
the potential to change the overall level or nature of risk in our markets).
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and Germany and the European Union are also looking
into whether special rules are needed for the industry. 7
A hedge fund in the United States is defined by its niche in
our federal securities acts. This is not randomly related to
the flourishing of the hedge fund industry. Hedge funds
owe a substantial degree of their success to their freedom
from federal regulations on their formation, organization
and trading practices. Tighten up hedge fund regulation
and we threaten their competitive advantage. I would
rather we loosen up the restraints on hedge fund
competitors, such as mutual funds, and allow others to
enjoy the trading advantages now enjoyed by hedge funds.
This short piece is on the merits of government regulation
of hedge funds.8  The article begins with background
information on hedge funds and the current state of their
regulation. After sifting through the various reasons
advanced for regulating hedge funds, and focusing on three
in particular - short selling, leverage, and funds offunds, I
argue that extensive direct regulation of hedge funds is
unnecessary and may harm the country's trading markets.
7 Thorns in the Foliage; Regulating Hedge Funds, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 2006 at 31
(In Britain, the Financial Services Authority has begun investigating the unfair
treatment of investors and potential conflicts of interest among fund managers. France,
Germany, and Ireland have adopted new regulatory structures that permit retail
investment in hedge funds. The European Union commissioned an "expert group" to
harmonize rules and taxation of hedge funds among member states.).
8 For recent articles on the regulation of hedge funds, see Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC
At 70: Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds And Stock Market Volatility - What
Regulation By The Securities and Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 909, 949 (2005) ("In the absence of a new crisis involving derivatives,
excessive leverage in the market or manipulative activities by institutional investors, it
is unlikely that Congress, the SEC or any other financial regulator will decide to study
and reform institutional investor behavior."); Andrew M. Kulpa & Butzel Long, The
Wolf In Shareholder's Clothing: Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game Theory and
Voting Structures To Exploit Corporate Control and Governance, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus.
L.J. 4 (2005) ("Fund managers are focusing on game theory voting models in order to
predict how other voters will react to any given situation."); Charlene Davis Luke,
Beating The "Wrap": The Agency Effort To Control Wraparound Insurance Tax
Shelters, 25 VA. TAX REV. 129, 132 (2005) ("[I]nsurance companies - with the likely
complicity of sophisticated, wealthy taxpayers - wrapped private placement hedge fund
interests inside variable insurance products in order to defer tax on the ordinary income
thrown off by such interests."); David Skeel, Behind the Hedge, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Dec.
2005, at 28 ("As long as the pressure to take unreasonable risks and to show outsized
returns continues, the basic integrity of the markets, and the investments of millions of
Americans who think they have nothing to do with hedge funds, will be in danger.").
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Indeed, the dramatic growth of hedge funds is in part
attributable to the current overregulation of registered
investment companies. We should, therefore, not tighten
the regulation of hedge funds but lighten the regulation of
registered investment companies. I also argue, however,
that the strengthening of some forms of indirect regulation
of hedge fund leverage, principally limits on banks that
lend to and are counterparties of hedge funds, may make
sense.
I. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND?
A hedge fund is a privately-held, privately-managed investment
fund. The funds are designed to maximize their freedom to employ
complex trading strategies by minimizing their regulation under various
federal statutes. The most accurate definition of a hedge fund is a fund that
is not registered under a list of specific federal acts. The funds are exempt
from the public offering registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933, 9 the periodic reporting obligations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and the registration requirements of the Investment Company Act of
1940.10 Until the new Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") rule
changes that went into effect this year, most hedge funds were also exempt
from the registration requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.11
A hedge fund manager raises money from wealthy individuals and
institutional investors using an exemption for "private offerings" under the
Securities Act of 1933, Rule 506 of Regulation D. 12 Most hedge funds
satisfy the exemption by marketing themselves only to "accredited
investors," institutional investors, 13 insiders, or natural persons with a net
worth of over $1 million or income over $200,000 for each of the last two
years. 14 Funds that use Rule 506 are prohibited from using any form of
"general solicitation or general advertising."'1 5 The SEC applies a "pre-
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).
,0 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (Supp. 2006); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2000).
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2000). See also Scannell, supra note 5.
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).
13 Banks, savings and loan associations, registered broker/dealers, investment
companies, licensed small business investment companies, employee benefit plans, and
other business entities and trusts with more than $5 million in assets. 17 C.F.R. §
230.501 (2005).
14 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2005). The funds can include up to thirty-five non-
accredited investors who are sophisticated or have sophisticated advisers. In practice,
however, hedge funds, in order to limit their liability exposure, rarely have clients who
are not accredited investor clients.
" 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2005).
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existing, substantive relationship" test when deciding that the general
solicitation rule has not been violated.1
6
A hedge fund's goal is to remit to those investors a high rate of
return on their capital contributions through sophisticated trading strategies
in securities, currencies, and derivatives. 17 If a fund manager is successful
for fund investors, the fund manager is handsomely paid.' 8 The fund
manager takes a one to two percent management fee and twenty percent of
the fund's profits (the carry).1 9 The top twenty-five fund managers last year
grossed over $130 million.20 A successful manager usually establishes a
number of distinct, follow-up funds. If a fund manager earns lackluster
returns, the investors pull their capital and will not support a manager's
effort to raise new funds. Historically, the hedge funds operate with a very
short "lock-in," the amount of time an investor must commit money
pledged to the fund.2 1 Those hedge funds that lose money, and many do,
simply wither away. It is a raw "survival of the fittest" industry.
Moreover, a hedge fund is careful to avoid classification as a
financial market player that is specifically regulated in the federal
legislation. A hedge fund, for example, is not an underwriter, a market-
maker, or a broker-dealer (market intermediary).22 A bank or investment
subsidiary of an operating company is not a hedge fund. 3 Hedge funds are
also careful, by having less than 500 investors, to avoid the periodic
16 A pre-existing relationship between the hedge fund and its client must exist at least
thirty days before the investor may invest. E.g., IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996
WL431821, at *1 (July 26, 1996); Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1997 WL282988, at *3 (May 29, 1997).
17 CITIGROUP ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, HEDGE FUND PRIMER 2 (2004), available at
http://www.smithbarney.com/pdf/HedgeFundPrime 0305.pdf (stating that hedge funds
seek to generate attractive absolute returns regardless of the direction of capital markets,
and listing a variety of hedge fund strategies).
18 Jenny Anderson, Atop Hedge Funds, Richest of the Rich Get Even More So, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2006, at C2 (Anderson explains that the magic behind the money is the
compensation structure of a hedge fund. Institutions like endowments and pension
funds have continually flocked to hedge funds, fueling the hedge fund boom.).
'9 Id. See also SCOTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUNDS, IN FINANCIAL PRODUCT
FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, 11-5 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2000).
20 Anderson, supra note 18.
21 See CITIGROUP ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, supra note 17, at 7 (Most hedge funds
specify a lockup period of six months to five years, during which an investment cannot
be redeemed.). The short lock-in is a substitute for clients' ability to sell their interests
in a fund. Most hedge funds prohibit any transfer of client interests without the written
consent of the hedge fund manager. Rule 506's restrictions on resale are, therefore, not
a problem.
22 Id. at 2 (Hedge funds are private, less regulated investment pools that invest in
securities markets and derivatives on a leveraged basis. Hedge funds typically take the
form of a partnership or limited liability corporation.). Hedge funds are "traders", those
that buy and sell securities for investment, not "dealers."
23 ,,
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reporting obligations of Section 12 of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 12g-
1.
The most important regulatory exemption for hedge funds is found
in the Investment Company Act of 1940, an act that regulates mutual funds.
Hedge funds rely on one of two statutory exclusions in the definition of an
investment company. Hedge funds either have less than 100 investors24 or
have only investors that are "qualified purchasers," individuals who own
over $5 million in investments or companies with over $25 million in
investments.2 5 A hedge fund, lying outside regulations for these entities,
may use investment techniques that are forbidden to the registered
26investment companies. The most notable technique that is more freely
available to hedge funds than other specifically regulated financial entities
is "shorting," betting on decreases in value in asset classes 7
Most hedge fund investment strategies are complex, involving a
combination of several coordinated trading positions to make the desired
market play. Several of the strategies have common names. In "convertible
arbitrage," for example, a hedge fund goes long in convertible securities
(bonds or shares that are exchangeable for another form of securities,
usually common shares, at a pre-set price) and simultaneously shorts the
28shares. In "merger arbitrage," a hedge fund buys target company stock
and shorts the stock of the purchaser. 9 In "global macro" plays, a fund
takes a long position in one country's currency and shorts the currency of
another (this is also done with government debt) . In "market neutral"
plays, a fund takes offsetting long positions in undervalued companies and
31
short positions in overvalued companies.
There are now "funds of funds" ("FOF"s) that invest in a basket
of hedge funds.32 Some of these funds are offered to the public, worrying
regulators.
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (Supp. 2006).
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2000).
26 ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS, 4-5 (2000) (Mutual funds must abide
by SEC rules that provide limitations on leverage and short selling. Hedge funds have
more flexibility with their investment strategies because they do not have to abide by
these rules.).
27 Id. See also CITIGROUP ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS supra note 17, at 6.
28 IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, at 52 (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/GFSR/2004/02/pdf/gfsrO9O4.pdf (listing and
defining various hedge fund strategies, including equity market neutral, convertible
arbitrage, fixed income, distressed securities, merger arbitrage/risk arbitrage, equity
hedge, sector composite, emerging markets, global macro, and short selling). See also
SEC Staff Report to the SEC: Implications of the Groiwth of Hedge Funds, at 34-36
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
29 IMF, supra note 28, at 52.30 Id.
31 id.
32 Dave Kansas, Making Sense of Wall Street --- As Investment Choices Pile Up,
Grasping Fundamentals Is Key; Hedge-Fund Boom Explained, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
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Hedge funds also structure their operations to avoid other
regulations as well. Hedge funds also typically avoid the regulation of
"commodity pools" by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC). New CFTC rules exempt pools that sell only to sophisticated
participants, "accredited investors" under Regulation D34 or "qualified
purchasers" under the Investment Company Act.35  Hedge funds avoid
regulation under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by
limiting the ownership interest of any employee benefit plan to less than
36twenty-five percent of the fund .
II. THE VALUE OF HEDGE FUNDS
Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Office of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York notes the positive role played by hedge
funds:
Hedge funds play a valuable arbitrage role in reducing or
eliminating mispricing in financial markets. They are an
important source of liquidity, both in periods of calm and
stress. They add depth and breadth to our capital
markets. By taking risks that would otherwise have
remained on the balance sheets of other financial
institutions, they provide an importance source of risk
transfer and diversification.3
In a later speech Geithner noted that "Hedge funds, private equity funds and
other kinds of investment vehicles help to disperse risk and add liquidity. 38
The testimony of Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Director of the
Division of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board, provides
an example:
2006, at BI ("Funds of funds" are pools of money gathered from individuals and
institutions, which in turn are funneled into a group of hedge funds. This practice has
opened the world of hedge funds to new, smaller class of investors.).
33 id.
34 17 C.F.R. § 4.13 (2005); 17 C.F.R. § 4.30 (2005).
35 17 C.F.R. § 4.13(a)(4) (2005).
36 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f)(1) (2006).
37 Timothy F. Geithner, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, Keynote
Address at the National Conference on the Securities Industry: Hedge Funds and Their
Implications for the Financial System (November 17, 2004), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2004/geiO4l117.html.
38 Timothy F. Geithner, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, Remarks
at the Institute of International Bankers Luncheon in New York City (October 18,
2005), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2005/geiO51018.html.
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In various capital markets, hedge funds are increasingly
consequential as providers of liquidity and absorbers of
risk. For example, a study of the markets in U.S. dollar
interest rate options indicated that participants viewed
hedge funds as a significant stabilizing force. In particular,
when the options and other fixed income markets were
under stress in the summer of 2003, the willingness of
hedge funds to sell options following a spike in the options
prices helped restore market liquidity and limit losses to
derivatives dealers and investors in fixed-rate mortgages
and mortgage-backed securities. Hedge funds reportedly
are significant buyers of the riskier equity and subordinated
tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and of
asset-backed securities, including securities backed by
39
nonconforming residential mortgages.
III. THE NEW SEC RULES REQUIRING THE REGISTRATION OF HEDGE
FUND MANAGERS
As noted above, historically, hedge funds have operated in the
exceptions and exemptions of the Securities Act of 1933 (there is no public
offering), 40 the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (they are not publicly
traded companies),4' the Investment Company Act of 1940 (they are not
mutual funds), 2 and, until recently, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(until this year they were not public investment advisers). 43
This is not to say that they have been "unregulated," as many do.
The anti-fraud provisions of the '33 and '34 acts apply with full force to the
activities of the funds44 and state laws against investor fraud apply as well.
45
Hedge fund managers cannot make false statements of material information
(or use misleading material half-truth) when dealing with their investors or
counterparties in trades.4 6 Banking laws also restrict the activities of hedge
fund lenders - banks - in significant respects.47
39 The Role of Hedge Funds in the Capital Market: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Securities and Investment, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th
Cong. (May 16, 2006) (testimony of Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Director, Division
of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve Board), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony /2006/20060516/default.htm.
40 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (Supp. 2006).
41 See 15 U.S.C.. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2000).
4, See 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3(b) (2000).
44 See id. § 80b-6 (2000).
45 See id. § 80b-3a(b)(2).
46 See id. § 80b-6(1).
47 See discussion infra pp. 28-30.
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Thus far the SEC has responded to calls to regulate hedge funds
with fairly mild registration requirements that took effect in February of
2006.48 The SEC narrowed the traditional exemption under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 enjoyed by the funds under the "private adviser
exemption." Section 203(b)(3) exempts an adviser from registration if it (1)
has had less than fifteen clients in the past twelve months, (2) does not hold
itself out generally to the public as an investment adviser, and (3) is not an
adviser to any mutual fund (registered investment company). 49 An exempt
adviser is still subject to the Act's antifraud requirements0 as well as Rule
IOb-5 under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.5'
For the purposes of the fifteen client exemption, until this year the
fund itself counted as a single client for an adviser (and an adviser was its
own client).52 A single hedge fund manager could advise fourteen different
funds, each with multiple investors, and stay within the exemption. New
SEC Rule 203(b)-(3)-2 contains a "look-through" rule. The section requires
investment advisers to count each owner of a "private fund" as a client for
the purposes of determining the availability of the private adviser
exemption. As a result, the adviser of any hedge fund that has had more
than fourteen investors during the past twelve months loses the private
adviser exemption. Moreover, an adviser that advises individuals outside a
fund must count those clients along with the fund investors in determining
the number of advisees for the purposes of the section. There are special
secondary "look-through" rules for a fund of funds.53
The new rule carefully defines "private funds" that are subject to
the "look-through" rule to exclude other pooled investment vehicles such as
private equity funds and venture capital funds.54 A company is a private
fund only if the fund permits investors to redeem their money in the fund
within two years of the time of investment. Private equity funds and
venture capital funds typically require commitments of capital well in
excess of two years. Hedge funds average lock-up period prior to the new
rule was less than twelve months. 55 The new rule also carefully exempts
41 Scannell, supra note 5.
49 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 and 279).50 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2000).
51 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
52 A single hedge fund could have up to 499 investors and not register. Once a fund had
500 investors it had an obligation to register under section 12 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. 78h, and SEC Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-1 (2006), if its assets were in
excess of $10 million.
51 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2005).
54 
id.
55 Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., The Hedge Fund Industry Products, Services, or
Capabilities, BERNSTEIN RESEARCH CALL, May 19, 2003, at 5.
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from the "look-though" rule investment adviser clients that are business
organizations (insurance companies), broker-dealers and banks. 56
The new rule does not alter another exemption for the amount of
assets under management. A United States hedge fund adviser is exempt if
the fund holds less than $25 million in assets.
With the exemption to the Investment Advisers Act lifted, hedge
funds must now register with the SEC.57 Registered advisers file a Form
ADV. Part I discloses, among other things, an investment adviser firm's
name and location, the number of funds managed, the amount of assets
under management (a set of financials), the method of compensation, the
owners of the advisory firm, the number of employees, disciplinary history,
affiliates of the firm (those who control or are controlled by the firm), types
of clients, and other business activities and clients. Part II of Form ADV
gives details on the manager's business background, a basic fee schedule,
potential conflicts of interest between the manager and the investors in the
fund, and general information on types of investments and trading strategy.
The name, education and previous five years of business experience of each
member of the firm's investment group must be included.
Once registered as an investment adviser, a fund manager is subject
to discretionary SEC examinations of its books and procedures. 58
Registration also enables the SEC to screen hedge fund advisers for prior
convictions or other professional misconduct.
59
Registered advisers must adopt compliance procedures,
administered through an internal compliance officer, adopt and enforce a
written code of ethics and a proxy voting procedure, keep specified client
accounts and records, and furnish each client or prospective client with a
written disclosure statement (Part II of Form ADV) containing a general
description of trading practices.
Registration under the Advisers Act also requires investors in most
hedge funds to meet minimum net worth standards of a "qualified client"
56 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,073 (Dec. 10, 2004) (An entity is not a "private fund" unless it would be
subject to the Investment Company Act but for the exception, which defines an
"investment company" in either 3(c)(1) (a "3(c)(1) fund") or 3(c)(7) (a "3(c)(7) fund."
Thus, most business organizations may be exempted from the "look-through" rule.).
57 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
51 Id. at 72,061 and n.85 (The staff s examination may include review of the advisory
firm's internal controls and procedures; the staff may also determine the adequacy of
these procedures for valuing client assets, placing and allocating trades, and arranging
for custody of client funds and securities. The staff may further examine the adviser's
performance claims and delivery of its client disclosure brochure.).
59 Id. at 72,078 (The Commission may screen the adviser and associated individuals,
and deny registration if they have been convicted of a felony or otherwise have a prior
disciplinary record subjecting them to disqualification. This is aimed at discouraging
"scam artists" from entering the hedge fund industry.).
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under SEC Rule 205-3.6o Each investor must have a net worth of at least
$1.5 million or at least $750,000 of assets with the adviser.6'
The SEC releases on the new rules take the position that the
intrusion on hedge fund operations is minimal. The SEC stresses that
registration under the Investment Advisers Act does not require an adviser
to follow or avoid any particular trading strategy, does not require or
prohibit any specific investments, and does not require an adviser to reveal
their specific trading strategies or disclose their specific portfolio
holdings.62
Previously unregistered hedge fund managers reported to the Wall
Street Journal that the new regulations are not "slight" or "minimal., 63 The
new rules, some claimed, will cost their funds approximately $500,000 a
64year. Some managers have fretted about the potentially crippling time lost
in a minute-to-minute, bet-the-house trading business when dealing with
SEC examiners who do not understand the trading strategies and will take
65time to be educated. Other managers wonder about the inevitable
heightened exposure to private and public litigation that additional
mandatory disclosures on technical matters, especially those on trading
patterns, would bring.
The SEC's response was to dismiss the claims with a hint of
derision by noting that it was already applying the Institutional Investor's
Act to a number of hedge funds that were already registered under the Act
(some voluntarily).66 The SEC relied heavily on the comments of those
hedge fund managers that were registered under the older rules, noting that
those managers did not believe the rules were an intrusion on their
67investment operations. Moreover, the SEC noted that it had no trouble
understanding sophisticated trading practices of hedge fund operators. 68
The response of the SEC was a high-wire act: the agency was in the delicate
position of both asserting that the new rules were necessary and would have
positive consequences and that the new rules would have a minimal effect
on hedge fund trading.
The new regulations will have some consequences. First, some
hedge funds have increased their investor lock-in to over two years to avoid
60 Id. at 72,064.
61 Id. ("Investor" in a private investment company that charges a performance fee.)
62 id.
63 Gregory Zuckerman and Ian McDonald, Hedge Funds Avoid SEC Registration Rule -
-- Some Big Firms Change Lockups, Stop Accepting New Investments To Take
Advantage of Loopholes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2005, at C1.
64 id.
65 id.
66 Registration Under the Adviser's Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,062 (Dec. 10, 2004).
67 id.
68 Id. at 72,062 (stressing the existing responsibility to registered hedge funds, and that
there is "nothing unique" that would make examination ineffective).
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registration. The longer the lock-in the less control investors have over
fund managers' activities. Second, some hedge fund advisers will move
offshore to organize their funds. 6 9 The offshore funds must register if they
have more than fourteen United States clients, but avoid some of the Act's
requirements, specifically the compliance, custody and proxy voting rules.
The SEC itself noted that seventy percent of hedge funds are organized
offshore. And third, there will be more consolidation among hedge fund
firms. Avoiding registration under the Investment Advisers Act provided a
check on hedge fund mergers. Once most hedge fund advisers have
registered the check on mergers largely disappears.70
Moreover, the small seedling of new regulations will, no doubt,
grow. The two commissioners that dissented argued, among other things,
that the rules did not match the SEC policy arguments in justification. 1 In
other words, if the SEC is serious about its policy concerns, more tailored
rules must follow.
Moreover, there is a political inevitability of additional rules. With
each new hedge fund failure, and there will be failures, the SEC will face a
harsh round of questioning over why the agency did not catch the problem.
Hedge funds offer high returns in exchange for high levels of risk. In any
given year some hedge funds will lose money and some will go out of
business. One can be sure that hedge funds will continue to fail under the
new rules and some of those that do will have engaged in fraudulent
conduct.
A prominent reason given by the SEC for its new rules is the
"deterrence and early discovery of fraud."' 2 If under the new rules the SEC
fails to discover a substantial fraud, which at some point it will, the quick
attack will be on the rules - that the rules are inadequate. The SEC's
defensive response inevitability will be to successively grow its disclosure
rules and structural requirements. I anticipate that sooner rather than later,
the SEC will have a new section of rules devoted exclusively to hedge
funds. The new rules, not the possible future extensions of the rules (the
"slippery slope" position), are a problem.
69 Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing before H. Comm. On Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th
Cong. 26 (1998) (Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan) (expressing his
concern that regulation of the hedge fund industry may compel a move of the industry
overseas, which would diminish federal oversight).
70 See Hedge Fund Regulation May Force Consolidation, PIPELINE 3 (June 15, 2003)
(concluding that registration of hedge funds would impose significant burdens on
smaller hedge funds); Arden Dale, Small Mutual-Fund Firms Cry Uncle New Rules
Protect Investors, But They Can be a Burden; Cost of a Compliance Cop, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 13, 2004 at C15 (arguing that mutual funds that manage less that $1 billion bear
the costs of regulatory requirements).
71 See Registration Under the Adviser's Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
72 Id. at 72,061-63.
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IV. WHY ARE WE WORRIED ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS?
The buzz over hedge funds pulls at a wide variety of people who
have different concerns.
1) People who fear concentrations of money see hedge funds as too large.
Hedge funds have grown rapidly, both in number and size. 3 Hedge funds
also tend to operate in loose cooperation, like wolf packs. 4
2) People who distrust the wealthy elite see hedge funds as the exclusive
playground of a very wealthy elite class of investors. 5 These wealthy
investors appear to be making double-digit returns not available to normal
investors.7 6
3) People who fear secret conspiracies see hedge funds as too shadowy.77
Chairman Bernanke of the Federal Reserve System had described them as
"opaque. 7 8 The funds do not have to disclose their membership or their
investment strategies, which depend on speed, cleverness and leverage.
79
7, See, e.g., David A. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh, Advice on Coping With Hedge Fund
Activism, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 2006, at 5 (Growing hedge fund financial clout - over $1
trillion in assets - has caused increased hedge fund activism.).
74Id. (When one hedge fund takes a position in a company, other hedge funds will buy
stock shortly thereafter. When hedge funds act in concert, their behavior is referred to
as a "wolf pack" approach.). See also Kulpa and Long, supra note 8, at 4 (arguing that
cooperative behavior among hedge funds allows hedge funds to raid companies in
packs. Several hedge funds may combine their voting power to exert governance power
over a firm or corporation.).
75 See, e.g., Charles Stein, The Smart Money is Going into Hedge Funds, But How
Smart Is It?, BOSTON GLOBE, October 24, 2004, at FI (Hedge funds are only available
to institutional investors and only the most wealthy individuals. However, the
popularity of hedge funds may eventually undermine their performance by decreasing
profit margins. Quoting Jack Meyer, president of Harvard Management, the investment
arm of Harvard University, "The returns will gradually decline until they get to be very
uninteresting."); Peter Hess, Hedge Funds Tighten Up, SECURITIES INDUSTRY NEWS,
June 20, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 9747163 (Although hedge funds were once an
elite vehicle available to only wealthy individuals, they are increasingly welcoming
pension funds and institutions such as universities.).
76 Stein, supra note 75, at F 1.
77 See, e.g., Joseph Nocera, Offering Up An Even Dozen Odds and Ends, N. Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2005, at C1 (Secrecy is the biggest problem with the hedge fund industry,
stating, "It's scary that nobody knows what hedge funds are doing, or how much they
are leveraged; it conjures up visions of Long-Term Capital Management, which put a
huge scare into the financial system when it blew up in the late 1990's."); Riva D.
Atlas, Hedge Fund Rumors Rattle Markets, N. Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at C2 (stating
that the secrecy of hedge funds as well as the collapse of LTCM have made a number of
investors uneasy).
78 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference (May 16, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/speeches/2006/200605162/default.htm).
79 ,,
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4) People who do not like sharp lenders of last resort believe some hedge
funds are vultures, demanding confiscatory terms from those in dire
financial situations.80
5) People who condemn risk-taking see hedge funds as a form of
gambling." Hedge funds use heavy leverage to generate high returns.
They borrow heavily from banks and other sources to fund their trading
82strategies. Many of the funds have shown spectacular returns while a few
have been spectacular failures. When their strategies fail, they can rake
up huge losses for not only their members but also their lenders and
counterparties.84
6) People who suspect fraud whenever there is complexity find hedge funds
too tricky. 5 News reports of their very sophisticated trading maneuvers do
leak out. Hedge funds often play the short-side of the market, raising old
prejudices against short-sellers. To some, the complex trading maneuvers
border on cheating by taking advantage of holes in our laws and rules. 
6
The SEC lists as one of its primary reasons for its new hedge fund
regulations, a number of troubling incidences of fraud perpetrated by hedge
fund operators.8
80 See, e.g., David J. Brophy, Paige Parker Ouimet, & Clemens Sialm, Hedge Funds as
Investors of Last Resort (EFA Moscow Meetings 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-782791 (finding that struggling
companies that receive financing from hedge funds significantly underperform
struggling companies that receive funding elsewhere); Eric Altbach, The Asian Crisis
and the 1XF: After the Deluge, The Debate (Part 2 of 2), JEI REP., May 1, 1998,
available at 1998 WLNR 3612710 (Critics note that bailouts by the institutions such as
International Monetary Fund encourage hedge fund irresponsibility and propagate
financial crisis because lenders act knowing the IMF will absorb losses.).
81 See, e.g., Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV.
681, 686-88 (2000) (The use of leveraging by hedge funds can result in tremendous
profits or catastrophic losses, which can cripple segments of the financial market or
even the market itself. Gibson concludes that limited regulation is necessary to prevent
excessive use of leverage.).
82 Id.
83 Karmel, supra note 8, at 943 (Long Term Capital Management was a hedge fund
founded in 1994 by John Merriweather. On its board were two Nobel laureates in
economics, including Myron Scholes and Robert Carhart Merton. LCTM maintained a
risky portfolio that, as of the end of 1997, was leveraged twenty-eight to one. Although
initially successful, it folded in 1998, losing over $2.3 billion in several months.).
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Daniel K. Liffmann, Note, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the
Investment Advisers Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 2147, 2168 - 69 (2005)
86 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 8, at 31 (arguing that the combination of low oversight,
extravagant earnings, and performance based compensation has encouraged fraud in
hedge fund investment); Liffman, supra note 85, at 2169-74 (Increasing popularity of
hedge funds has been accompanied by more cases of fraud, a trend that hurts ordinary
investors and poses dangers to world markets.).
87 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054, 72,056-57 (Dec. 10, 2004).
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7) People who are suspicious of "get-rich-quick, guaranteed" come-on
pitches believe that hedge funds may be duping their own investors with
false promises of easy money." Colleges such as The College of Wooster
in Ohio have over eighty percent of their entire endowment in hedge funds,
to the consternation of some of their alumni who wonder whether the
college officials are overmatched when responding to hedge fund
solicitations.89
8) People who value market stability in the securities and currency markets
worry that hedge funds add to market volatility that is unrelated to
fundamental market values. 90 The funds contribute to market bubbles and
panics. 91
9) People with positions in traditional operating companies see hedge funds
as threatening.92 Some hedge funds take an "activist" investor tack, pushing
around the incumbent management in blue chip companies such as Time-
Warner, Wendy's, McDonalds, Knight Ridder, and General Motors.
93
These actions have aroused the attention and ire of main street management
and their New York lawyers, a powerful and entrenched interest group.
88 See, e.g. Taking Stock, MONEY MANAGEMENT, April 1, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 5703984 (Hedge funds attract investors through promises of exclusivity, the
best and brightest managers, and, most importantly, absolute returns.); Will Shanley,
Three Accused of Fraud in Hedge Fund; The Colorado Springs Men Are Arrested for
Allegedly Bilking 350 Investors Out of $750 Million from 2002-2004, DENVER POST,
May 17, 2006 at C-0 I (describing a recent case where two men from Colorado Springs
bilked $7.5 million from hundreds of investors. The state securities commissioner
stated, "Most investors were lured by the false promise of high returns.").
89 See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, Big Risk on Campus: Portfolios at Harvard and Yale Have
Smaller Colleges Moving Aggressively into Hedge Funds. They May Be Putting Their
Endowments in Jeopardy, BUSINESSWEEK, May 15, 2006, at 32 (The success of
prestigious universities such as Harvard and Yale at investing their sizable endowments
in hedge funds has caused many smaller universities to follow suit. However, many of
these universities are inexperienced with sophisticated investment strategies and
maintain endowments staffs of only two to three people.).
90 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES (John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 2000) (1978) (When LTCM collapsed in 1998, the funds lenders were forced
to write of losses, among them the Dresdener Bank, the Credit Suisse First Boston, and
the Union Bank of Switzerland for $700 million.).
91 Id.
92 See, e.g.,. Kulpa and Long, supra note 8, at 4.
93 See, e.g., Avital Louria Hahn, Retaking The High Ground, Companies Are Fighting
Back Against the Shareholder Activism of Hedge Funds, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIGEST,
May 29, 2006 (explaining that some corporations have taken defensive measures
against activist hedge funds. These strategies include "the adoption of bylaws that limit
a shareholder's ability to call a special meeting and/or require advanced notice for board
nominations and other shareholder proposals."); Brent Shearer, Dangerous Waters For
Dealmakers: Shareholder Sharks Are Using Their Clout To Influence Deals, MERGERS
& ACQUISITIONS, Mar. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 3500929 (naming Wendy's,
McDonald's, and GM as the latest victims of hedge fund activism).
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This combination of factors - large size, elite investors, big returns
on high risks, speed, trading sophistication, attacks on established interests,
secrecy, and periodic, spectacular failure - create an opportunity to foment
popular fear of a new breed of shadowy financial monsters. The populist
anti-hedge fund spin almost writes itself: a wealthy, backroom elite group
of investors, driven by selfish greed, take excessive risks with cheater-style
trading strategies that imperil the health of our banks and our corporations -
our entire economy.94 And popular fear creates a cry for government
control that is heard by politicians courting voters.95
Of the concerns, three stand out. One concern, our hostility
towards short-selling, deserves special mention because of its strong history
and current popular appeal. Two other concerns, leverage and FOFs,
warrant special attention because they are very real problems.
V. SHORT-SELLING AND VOTE BUYING
Hedge funds primary market advantage has been that they could
use trading strategies that "short" the market. Registered investment
companies do not have such freedom. Mutual funds, for example, are
permitted to short sell but under a heavy restriction; a mutual fund must
cover any open short positions by setting aside cash or other liquid
96
securities.
The traditional method of shorting the market is to borrow stock,
sell the borrowed shares, hope the price drops, and repurchase shares at a
lower price for return to the lender.97 A trader can also short the market by
using derivatives. For example an investor can short shares by purchasing a
94 See generally, GARY WEISS, WALL STREET VERSUS AMERICA: THE RAMPANT GREED
AND DISHONESTY THAT IMPERIL YOUR INVESTMENTS (2006) (detailing the various ways
in which the financial industry, including "Wild-West style" hedge funds, preys on
small investors). See also DANIEL REINGOLD CONFESSIONS OF A WALL STREET
ANALYST: A TRUE STORY OF INSIDE INFORMATION AND CORRUPTION IN THE STOCK
MARKET (2006) (exposing the unfair and often-illegal use of inside information on Wall
Street).
95 Amy Borrus, A Guide to the Hedge-Fund Maze, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, (Oct. 19,
2005), available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct2005/
nf20051019 1613 db016.htm (Tougher regulation is opposed by the hedge fund
industry, whose money buys a great deal of influence on Capitol Hill. However, "no
politician wants to be linked to a scandal-tarred industry.").
96 Securities Trading Practice of Registered Investment Companies, Investment
Company Act of 1940 Release No. IC - 10666, 17 S.E.C. Docket 319 (April 18, 1979)
[hereinafter Release 10666]. Mutual funds must also ensure that they have the ability to
satisfy their redemption requirements under Section 22(e) of the Investment Company
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2005). This limits the amount of cash they can use in
the set aside.
97 TOM TAULLI, WHAT IS SHORT SELLING? 3-4 (2004).
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put option on the shares, selling future or forward contract on the shares, or
engaging in a swap contract on the shares. 98
Short-selling, making money when a stock (or other security) falls
in price, has always been controversial. There are two arguments against
the practice. First is the long standing historic disdain for those who profit
when others are suffering: A short seller is a "vulture" who makes money
when asset values decline. 99 Since most investors are "long," benefit when
asset values rise, those who are short benefit when most others are
suffering.1° ° Managers of firms also do not like short sellers, who have a
financial incentive to discover and reveal the company's dirty laundry.' 0'
The battles between managers and short sellers are the stuff of legend and
continue today. 0 2  Kenneth Lay, for example, the ex-CEO of Enron,
blamed short sellers, among others, for the collapse of the company in his
trial testimony (the jury did not buy it).10 3
Second, those who short the market frequently engage in market
manipulation. 0 4 Unscrupulous short traders in railroad stocks at the turn of
the century spread false negative rumors about companies to drive their
stock prices down. 10 5 Bribing journalists to print the lies was part of their
modus operandi. 1 6  Angry speculators responded with "corners," the
purchase of so many shares that short sellers could not cover their
positions. 107
Sometimes we fear that the manipulation is not driven by profit but
by international conflict. In times of international conflict there has always
been concern that a nation's enemies could attempt to injure its markets. 08
The NYSE imposed special short selling regulations during World War I,
fearing that the Kaiser would short our markets.1° 9 Following the terrorist
attack on September 11, 2001, the SEC investigated whether Osama Bin
98 Frank J. Fabozzi, Shorting Using Futures and Options, SHORT SELLING: STRATEGIES,
RISKS, AND REWARDS 17 (Frank J. Fabozzi, ed., 2004).
99 TAULLI, supra note 97, at 1.
100 Id.
1 Id at 15 (After viewing Enron's financial statements in October 2001, hedge fund
manager James Chanos realized that Enron's return on capital was very small, despite
its aggressive profit reports. Guessing the stock was extremely overvalued, Chanos
shorted it, making millions in the process.).
102 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. Short Sellers: Your 15 Minutes Have Arrived, WALL ST. J.,
APR. 5, 2006, at A21 (discussing the efforts by the CEOs of Biovail and Overstock.com
to attack short sellers in their companies stock).
103 Chidem Kurdas, Funds: 'Talk to Us', HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, 2006 WLNR
9092212 (May 26, 2006) ("Enron's Ken Lay blamed short sellers for the debacle, but a
jury has decided that the blame lies with him and his former colleagues.").




108 TAULLI, supra note 97, at v.
109 ,
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Laden had shorted stocks before the attack.' 10 (The investigation turned up
nothing.)'
Governments have responded by attempting to regulate specially or
even prohibit short selling. Until the 1850s, short selling was illegal in the
United States.' 2 Napoleon declared the practice "treason" when he felt that
it interfered with his financing his military campaigns.' 13 In 1995, the
Finance Ministry of Malaysia proposed that short-selling be punished by
caning.' 4  As of December 2001, ten countries still prohibit all short
selling. ' 15
In the United States, we still suffer from a crackdown on short
selling that followed the Great Depression.' 16 Section 10(a) the Securities
Act of 1934 authorizes the SEC to regulate short selling,'" and the
Investment Company Act of 1940 severely restricts the ability of mutual
funds to short. 118 The SEC responded by promulgating the "uptick" and
"zero-plus-tick" rules, which prohibit the short selling of a stock on a
United States exchange except at a price higher than the price of the last
trade or at a price equal to that of the last trade if the previous price change
was positive.' 9 The SEC is now experimenting with repealing the rule for
widely traded stocks. 120
Other legal constraints affect short selling. The Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation T requires a margin of fifty percent on short sales as
well as long positions in stock. 121 There are also short sale prohibitions
relating to specific market transactions: Rule 105 of SEC Regulation M
prevents traders from covering short positions entered into before the
effective date of a public offering with securities obtained in the public
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 E.g., J. EDWARD MEEKER, SHORT SELLING (1932).
113 TAULLI, supra note 97, at 1.
114 id.
115 Arturo Bris, William N. Goetzmann, and Ning Zhu, Efficiency and the Bear: Short
Sales and Markets around the World (March 13, 2006), available at
http://www.qwafafew.org/?q-filestore/download/378.
116 See Charles M. Jones and Owen A. Lamont, Short Sale Constraints and Stock
Returns, 66 J. OF FIN. EcON. 207 (2002).
117 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (2000).
1181d. § 80a-12(a) (2000). Changes in the Investments Company Act in 1977 have
allowed mutual fund managers some freedom to short. Registered investment
companies must set aside or segregate an amount equal to the daily price of the shorted
securities less any non-proceeds margin posted under applicable margin rules. See
Release 10666, supra note 96.
119See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Oa-1 (2006); SEC Rule IOa-1. See also NYSE Rule 440B;
NASD Rule 3350.
120 The SEC relaxed the uptick rules for approximately 1,000 actively-traded securities
and for after-hours trading of any approximately 1,000 securities. The SEC is studying
the impact of relaxing the rules.
121 12 C.F.R. § 220.18 (2006).
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distribution.122  Rule 14e-4 prohibits short tenders into public tender
offers. 
23
Hedge funds are not caught by the restrictions on mutual funds, are
able to use derivatives to avoid the margin requirements, and pioneered
procedures that reduce the direct costs of shorting. 124 The funds then used
their ability to short by designing combination long/short trading strategies,
hence the name "hedge," that enabled them to make very sophisticated and
nuanced bets on the price movements in the trading markets.1 25  Most
academics agree that hedge funds emergence as short sellers is positive,
eliminating some of the market over-pricing due to the high costs of short
selling.1 26 Academics point to the success of hedge funds as evidence that
mutual funds should be given more freedom to short. 12  They argue that
government should avoid the reverse prescription, a new set of regulations
that subject hedge funds to the same rules against shorting that apply to
mutual funds.
128
The second complaint noted above, that short sellers frequently
engage in market manipulation, is more serious. It is the source of some of
the new literature that argues in favor of hedge fund regulation.1 29 Yes,
traders who short are tempted to spread false negative rumors, creating the
"bear run." But traders who hold long are tempted to spread false positive
122 17 C.F.R. § 242.105 (2005).
123 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-4 (2005).
124 A short seller of stock must locate the shares, sell the shares borrowed, leave the
proceeds of the sale with the lender as collateral, pay the amount of any dividend to the
lender, maintain the position, locate shares to cover, and return the covering shares to
the lender.
125 WILLIAM J. CREREND, FUNDAMENTALS OF HEDGE FUND INVESTING 1 (1998). A
hedge funds takes a long position by buying and selling securities that it owns. It takes
a short position by selling borrowed securities with an expectation the price will go
down before the hedge fund must pay for them.
126 The classic studies are Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of
Opinion, 66 J. OF FIN. 1,151 (1977); Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia,
Constraints on Short Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information, J. OF
FIN. ECON. 277 (1987). See generally, Steven Jones & Glen Larsen, The Information
Content of Short Sales, SHORT SELLING: STRATEGIES, RISK & REWARDS 233 (Frank J.
Fabozzi, ed., 2004). See also The Long and Short of Hedge Funds: Effects of Strategies
for Managing Market Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Financial Services Comm.,
108th Congress (2003) (Testimony of Owen A. Lamont, Associate Professor of
Finance, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago) (stating that 270
companies that attacked short sellers had returns that lagged the market by forty-two
percent over the following three years).
127 Lamont Testimony, supra note 126.
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., Sherry M. Shore, SEC Hedge Fund Regulatory Implications on Asian
Emerging Markets: Bottom Line or Bust, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 563, 576
(2005) (suggesting that hedge funds were involved in market manipulation in Southeast
Asian currency markets).
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rumors, touting, and we penalize those that we catch; we do not prohibit the
practice (which would, of course, make our stock markets illegal). Another
illegal practice that has garnered a fair amount of media coverage is "naked
shorting," when a trader sells stock it does not own or has not borrowed.
130
The SEC has recently moved to tighten up its rules on naked shorting. 131
The new wrinkle to the manipulation argument is an attack on "vote
buying," hedge funds using buying shares before a record date to vote them
and using offsetting short positions to eliminate the economic consequences
of their votes. 132 The problem with the argument is that it is, well, false.
The cost of buying votes is tied to the economic consequence of the votes.
When does a hedge fund buy votes? The classic case of vote
buying happens in a contested takeover; the hedge fund buys votes in the
bidder to vote for closing a deal while holding stock in the target. 33 To
understand the strategy we need to set the stage. When a potential acquirer
makes a bid for a target, the bid is often at a twenty-five percent premium or
more over market price and the acquirer's shares often drop two to five
percent on the announcement. Bidder shareholders are not thrilled and
target shareholders are ecstatic. Target shareholders, therefore, have an
interest in whether the bidder shareholders will approve the acquisitions.
Some dabbling by the target shareholders in bidder shares is enviable. They
may buy a few bidder shares to prop up the price, but this is expensive. In
the criticized new tactic, a target shareholder buys votes in the bidder
without buying the shares, a much cheaper method of influencing the bidder
vote.
130 Since delivery of the stock is required three days from the sale, such a trader will
purchase the stock and cover it if the stock goes down at the end of three days or just
fail to deliver the stock if the stock goes up in price. Naked short selling is illegal
except in limited circumstances, principally market-making activities. See SEC Div. of
Market Regulation: Key Points About Regulation SHO (April 11, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm. See also Randall Smith & Shawn
Young, NYSE Probes Whether Short Sellers Fueled Steep Decline in Vonage Shares,
WALL ST. J., June 9, 2006, at C1 (recent case of claims of naked shorting).
M New Regulation SHO establishes "locate" and "close-out" requirements on broker-
dealers to reduce failures to deliver. See SEC Division of Market Regulation, supra
note 130. Equity securities that have an aggregate fail to deliver position for five days,
totaling over 10,000 shares and equal to at least 0. 5% of the issuer's total shares are put
on a "threshold security" list and brokers-dealers must close-out all failure to deliver
positions open over thirteen days by purchasing the underlying securities. Until a
position is closed out a broker-dealer may not purchase or clear a transaction in the
stock without borrowing the shares or entering into an agreement to borrow the shares.
132 See Kulpa & Long, supra note 8, at 12.
'33 See generally Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Voting and the
Takeover Debate, 58 VAND. L. REV. 453, 487 (2005) (developing a "realistic simulation
of corporate voting and applying it a variety of settings" and concluding that "the
current regulatory regime gives management too much discretion to reject unsolicited
bids at the expense of shareholder wealth maximization").
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For an illustration of the tactic, 134 consider the takeover of King
Pharmaceuticals by Mylan Laboratories. King and Mylan announced the
signing of a merger agreement on July 26, 2004.135 Mylan was to acquire
King in a stock-swap, reverse triangular merger. King's common
shareholders were to receive a fractional 0.9 Mylan common share for each
King common share they held. 136  Mylan shareholders had to vote to
approve the issuance of new Mylan stock for the deal. The exchange ratio
represented a premium for King stock at preannouncement prices. On the
disclosure of the merger, Mylan shares dropped in value and King shares
increased in value and the prices of the two shares became necessarily
linked. After the announcement, the deal spread between the trading
market prices of a ninety percent of a Mylan common share and one King
common share represented the market's assessment of likelihood that the
merger would close; the smaller the spread the higher the probability the
deal would close and the higher the spread the lower the probability that the
deal would close. After the announcement, the spread between Mylan and
King shares varied substantially day to day (even moment to moment) on
the current news of the likelihood that the deal would close.
Perry, an investment adviser to four hedge funds with $1 1 billion
under management and with substantial knowledge of both Mylan and
137King, undertook a very traditional risk arbitrage trading strategy. Perry
took a long position in the target, King, and an offsetting short position in
the acquirer, Mylan. The strategy "locks in" the deal spread and pays when
and if the deal closes. A corollary to the strategy is that if the deal spread
increases, and an arbitrager is comfortable accepting the risk, the arbitrager
unwinds the position on the smaller spread and reestablishes the lock-in at
the higher spread. Perry did this on several occasions.
A second hedge fund, run by Mr. Carl Icahn, took an opposite
position. His strategy is also well known but less frequently used. He
made a bet that the deal would not close. He shorted King common shares
and purchased a long position in Mylan common shares to profit should the
merger fail to close. Moreover, he announced that he intended to actively
134 Gossip on Wall Street is that target shareholders used the same tactic in the 2002
proxy fight over the $24 billion merger of Hewlett-Packard and Company.
135 Leila Abboud & Dennis K. Berman, Mylan to Buy King Pharmaceuticals --- Deal
Valued at $4 Billion Gives Generic-Drug Firm Access to Branded Products, WALL ST.
J., July 26, 2004, at A3 (stating that Mylan's move was part of a larger trend of
"generic-drug companies pushing into the branded-drug business").
136 Id.
137 Riskglossary.com, Even Driven Trading Strategy,
http://www.riskglossary.com/link/event -driven -strategy.htm (last visited June 14,
2006) (In a traditional risk arbitrage strategy, the acquirer proposes to buy the target
stock by exchanging its own stock for the stock of the target. The arbitrageur buys the
stock of the target and short sells the acquirer. If the merger is successful, the target's
stock is converted into the stock of the acquirer, and the arbitrageur completes the
arbitrage by delivering the converted stock into her short position.).
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use his voting rights from his Mylan shares to defeat the merger. In a
Schedule 13D filing 138 and a Form 14A filing139 (September 7, 2004), Mr.
Icahn announced that he would vote his long position in Mylan, and solicit
proxies from others to vote against the acquisition of King. 140
In response, Perry Corp. decided to buy shares in Mylan so as to
vote them in favor of the deal and off-set, to some degree, Mr. Icahn's
voting power. Perry recognized that the cost of the long position in Mylan
would necessarily reduce the profits from his risk arbitrage position that
depending on the deal closing successfully. Perry Corp. used two methods.
First, it simply purchased and held Mylan shares. The purchase is termed a
"box" because Perry did not use the newly purchased shares to cover its
outstanding short obligations in Mylan stock. 14 1  Second, Perry Corp.
purchased Mylan shares and entered into offsetting equity-interest rate swap
contracts on those shares with two international banks. In the swaps, Perry
Corp., in essence, shorted the newly purchased Mylan shares and the
counterparty banks took a long position in the shares. The banks in such
transactions often diversify or offset their positions by themselves shorting
the shares (borrowing and then selling the loaned shares). The banks then
pass the rebate cost for borrowing the shares back to the counterparty (in
this case Perry Corp). The rebate costs will rise as the cost for obtaining the
borrowed shares rises in response to market pressures.
On October 28, 2004, King disclosed that it would have to restate
previously issued financial statements and revisions to its third quarter
projections. The market learned of Perry's long position in Mylan shares
on November 12, 2004, in a Schedule 13F filing. 142 On November 19,
2004, Mr. Icahn criticized the Mylan purchase of King as an "egregious
mistake" and announced that it would make a public offer to purchase
138 Mylan Laboratories Inc., Schedule 13D, (Sept. 7, 2004),
http://investor.mylan.com/phoenix.zhtml?c-66563&p-irol-sec.
139 Mylan Laboratories Inc., Form 14A (Sept. 7, 2004),
http://investor.mylan.com/phoenix.zhtml?c-66563&p-irol-sec.
140 Health Care Brief-- Mylan Laboratories Inc.: Icahn Launches Proxy Fight Against
Merger iith King, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2004, at Al1 ("Mr. lcahn urged Mylan
shareholders to vote against proposed acquisition, saying the purchase premium 'is not
justified."').
141 When an investor "sells against the box," he shorts a security that he already owns
but chooses not to deliver. Short sales against the box are like traditional short sales,
but the investor holds on to the securities that he already owns. See Zachary T.
Knepper, Future-Priced Convertible Securities And The Outlook For "Death Spiral"
Securities-Fraud Litigation, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 359, 368, n. 60 (2004) (citing Ralph
S. Janvey, Short Selling, 20 SEC. REG. L.J. 270, 271-76 (1992)).
142 Mylan Laboratories Inc., Schedule 13F (Nov. 2004),
http://investor.mylan.com/phoenix.zhtml?c-66563&p-irol-sec; see also Group
Including Perry Reports Mylan Stake, Favors Buying King, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2004,
at Cl.
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Mylan stock at $20 a share, qualified with numerous contingencies.1 43 The
deal spread widened immediately on the Icahn announcement.
On November 22, 2004, theDailyDeal.com, a well-known and
widely followed open website, reported that Perry Corp. would vote its long
position in Mylan in favor of the merger and, importantly, that the Perry
Corp. position in Mylan was "hedged.' 44 The website concluded that Perry
Corp. and other speculators "may not have any economic interest in the
company. 1 45 The website also detailed that Perry Corp. held a traditional
risk arbitrage position in the two parties to the merger to "capture the
spread."' 146 A follow-up article in the New York Times on November 28,
1472004, contained the same information.. Perry Corp. filed a Schedule 13D
on November 29, 2004, disclosing that it held 9.89% of Mylan's common
shares and, significantly, that the shares were "hedged" through short-sales
(the box transactions) and through security-based swaps.14  The market
price of Mylan shares closed down 1.4% (18 cents down) on November 30,
2004, and the deal spread returned to levels evident in the stock price before
Mr. Icahn's announcement of a tender offer.
On January 12, 2005, Mylan announced that it did not expect to
close the deal and on February 27, 2005, Mylan formally terminated the
merger agreement. 149  By the end of March, Perry had unwound its
positions, having paid $5.7 million in costs to establish its short positions in
Mylan shares suffering a substantial loss on its trading positions in both
Mylan and King shares.
The argument against Perry's actions focuses on its interest in
Mylan; Perry has an incentive to vote its Perry shares against the interest of
Mylan shareholders to gain on its King stock. We worry that a hedge fund
that borrows shares, votes them, and returns them can vote the shares
against the interest of the company without cost or retribution. 150  The
143 Andrew Pollack, Icahn Offers $5.4 Billion For Mylan, Drug Maker, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov 20, 2004, at C3 (In a letter to Mylan directors, Icahn warned that the acquisition of
King was an "egregious mistake" that would transform Mylan into a "much riskier
hybrid focusing on branded products.").





147 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, For a Takeover Artist, One Bhiff Too Many?, N.Y. TIMES,
November 28, 2004, at Section 3.
148 Mylan Laboratories Inc. Schedule 13D, (Nov. 2004),
http://investor.mylan.com/phoenix.zhtml?c-66563&p-irol-sec; see also Group
Including Perry Reports Mylan Stake, supra note 143, at C1.
149 Mylan Abandons Pact to Purchase Drug Firm King, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2005, at
B4 (stating that the companies could not agree on a revised deal and that Mylan and
King mutually agreed to end the transaction).
50 See Kulpa and Long, supra note 8, at 12.
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argument is false because it omits the interest of the counterparty to the
short position, the loaner of the borrowed shares, or the counterparty to the
swap. The rental fee charged by the lender of the shares, who will get the
shares back after the vote, will take into account the likelihood that the
shares as returned will be devalued. If a hedge fund is likely to vote to hurt
a company, the fund must pay the lender for the right to do so. The rental
charge on the shares should approximate the loss that the hedge fund would
suffer if the fund had purchased the shares outright, voted them to hurt the
company, and sold them, a tactic that is admittedly legal.
The King takeover demonstrates that risk arbitrage in stock swap
takeovers can go both ways. An arbitrager can short' 5' the acquirer and go
long in the target (the usual strategy), as Perry Corp. did, or go long in the
acquirer and short the target (a more unusual strategy), as Mr. Icahn did. In
the typical takeover a deal puts negative price pressure on the acquirer's
stock and offers the target shareholders a price premium, the arbitrager who
holds a normal position profits if the deal closes and the arbitrager who
holds the unusual, reverse position expects to profit if the deal fails to close.
In the usual trading strategy, an arbitrager, in effect, purchases
("locks-in") the deal spread, the trading price of the target shares minus the
trading price of acquirer shares that a target shareholder will receive if the
deal closes. 5 2 After the arbitrager established the locked-in position at a
given deal spread, the gain or loss on the short position in the acquirer
offsets any changes in price in the target. The deal spread at lock-in
survives for the arbitrager assuming closing regardless of subsequent
market based changes in the spread. When the deal closes, the arbitrager
unwinds its positions and, in effect, is paid the spread and nets the trading
costs incurred. If the deal fails to close, the arbitrager may win or lose
dependant on the residual and now independent trading prices of the two
deal participants. The profit or loss is magnified by the heavy leveraged
inherent in the position. In the usual case, the price decline of the target
shares after a deal collapses means that the arbitrager will incur substantial
losses.
151 In the classic short position, the holder of the position borrows shares from a lender,
sells the borrowed shares, and later covers the loan (returns shares to the lender) with
new shares purchased in the market. If the share price has fallen from the date of sale to
the date of cover, the borrower makes money.
152 For a more generalized discussion of risk arbitrage, see Roger J. Dennis, This Little
Piggy Went to Market: The Regulation of Risk Arbitrage after Boesky, 52 ALB. L. REV.
841, 843-44 (1988) (analyzing the potential benefits of risk arbitrage); see Thomas Lee
Hazen, Volatility and Market Inefficiency: A Commentary on the Effects of Options,
Futures, and Risk Arbitrage on the Stock Market, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 794-95
(1987) (explaining regulation of risk arbitrage by the SEC); see Francesca Cornelli &
David D. Li, Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers in Takeovers (Rodney L. White Center
Working Paper No. 17-98), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 106708.
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The arbitragers in both the usual and unusual positions merely
change the profile of their economic interest in the transaction from a pure
long or short position to a hybrid position dependent on the deal closing.
The arbitragers' trades help drive market prices towards optimal
fundamental (or informational) values and aid the liquidity and depth of the
market during the post announcement, pre-closing period.
Each arbitrager has an incentive to vote the long position to make a
profit. The holder of a normal position (Perry) will vote shares in the target
for the deal and the holder of an unusual, opposite position (Icahn) will vote
shares in the acquirer to stop the deal. They will do so even if information
is available that they are not voting to maximize the stock price of the long
position. In the usual position, for example, an arbitrager may vote target
shares in favor of the merger even though a higher bid for the target shares
is possible. In the unusual, reverse position, an arbitrager may vote acquirer
shares, which the arbitrager owns, against the deal even if the deal
information turns more favorable (target has newly discovered value).
Typically both arbitragers will unwind their positions before the vote.
Each arbitrager's short position is not cost-free. The arbitrager
must pay a "rebate" rate to borrow the shares.'1 3 The rebate rate increases
when the stock goes "special," that is, when the borrowed stock is in short
supply because of substantial short-side interest.1 54 During routine times
the net rate the borrower must pay the stock owner is nominal, less than
twenty-five basis points (or .25%) per year. The stock is "general
collateral. 155 When the stock price is under stress, the stocks routinely "go
special" and the rebate prices increase substantially.1 56 Information on
which stocks have gone special is routinely, quickly, and widely distributed
in the trading markets. One can, for example, check a popular web site,
www.ShortSqueeze.com, for a daily posting of special stocks and an
explanation of the heavy borrowing volume in any named stock. Common
reasons for a stock going special are 1) general speculative disfavor of a
perceived overpriced stock, 2) earnings announcement program trades, and
3) merger arbitrage - the case here.1 57 Perry Corp. paid substantial fees, in
the millions, to establish its short positions.
153 Christoper C. Geczy, David K. Musto, & Adam V. Reed, Stock Are Special Too: An
Analysis of the Equity Lending Market, 66 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 241, 244
(2002).
114 Id. at 246.
155 d.
156 A recent Wall Street Journal article noted that the rebate prices of shares in
Overstock.com and in Martha Stewart Omnimedia, Inc. had reached twenty-five and
twenty percent of the share price respectively (2,500 and 2,000 basis points). See Jesse
Eisinger, Long & Short: It's a Tough Job, So Why Do They Do It? The Backward
Business of Short Selling, WALL ST. J., March 1, 2006, at C1.
157 Geczy, Musto & Reed, supra note 153, at 246.
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A study by Christopher C. Geczy, David K. Musto, & Adam V.
Reed found that as much as fifty percent of the raw merger arbitrage profits
are lost to share lenders. 158 This supports the common sense notion that
stock lending is, to an important degree, self-policing. In most acquisitions
in the past ten years or so, the target shareholders receive a substantial
premium over market price for their shares. The acquisition announcement
is greeted with some skepticism by the shareholders of the acquirer, who
worry that the acquirer has overpaid for the target, and with glee by the
shareholders of the target, who enjoy the surprise premium. The cost of
borrowing the acquirer's stock reflects the downward price pressure on the
acquirer's stock generated by the announced takeover. In other words, the
arbitrager is paying substantially for shifting down-side risk to those who
loan the arbitrager shares in the acquirer.
We can generalize from the takeover situation to all situations in
which an investor has an incentive to "buy votes." When an investor holds
stock of an acquirer in an acquisition and fears that the board has initiated
an imprudent investment, the investor has three options: investor can sell
the stock, keep the stock and vote no, or keep the stock and hedge the risk
of a yes vote by shorting the shares. In the third case the investor has no
economic incentive to vote either no or yes; her true economic incentive is
to abstain.
There are two inherent limits to this technique, one mechanical and
one market based. 159 On the mechanical side, the investor is limited in the
amount of stock that investor can hedge with traditional shorting by the
finite amount of stock available. Investors can never hedge enough to get
legal voting control (control of over fifty-one percent of the stock)1 60 and, in
practice, cannot hedge enough shares to get effective voting control (control
with less than fifty-one percent of the stock). In practice, only a small
percentage of most common stock is available to be borrowed and an
investor will be limited inherently by the supply. The average of the
amount of stock available for all loans to short traders is about five percent.
In times of heavy shorting, the average can rise to around fifteen percent; in
extraordinary cases the amount of available stock for shorts may touch
158 Id at 260.
159 Academics who have written on the question do not seem to appreciate either of the
limits. E.g., Henry T.C.Hu & Bernard S. Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders and Empty
Voting: Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership in Public Companies (U. of
Texas Law Sch., Law and Econ Research Paper No. 53, 2006) (omitting a discussion of
either).
160 For example, if there are 100 common shares of company A, the investor is limited
to capturing fifty percent of the vote. Investor can buy fifty shares and short fifty
shares, borrowing fifty and selling the fifty so borrowed. But the purchaser of the fifty
shares can vote them in her economic interest and, if need be, stymie the effort to get
legal control.
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twenty percent. Moreover, any one short trader cannot, of course, borrow
all the stock available.
Swaps in which a counterparty is content to accept short-side risk
are affected by the scarcity as most counterparties will diversify their risk
by borrowing shares. Naked swaps, swaps in which a counterparty does not
cover by borrowing shares, are rare (and when they exist are often only
temporary). So even in swaps the finite amount of stock available to borrow
has a limiting effect on a counterparty's willing to accept the long position.
In sum, the limited availability of stock that can be borrowed
necessarily limits the hedging strategy around shareholder record dates.
Ten percent or so, Perry Corp. held just under ten percent, represents a
practical limit to the strategy. The ten percent practical limit coincides with
the legal trigger, in section 16 of the Securities Act of 1933, of the short-
swing profit give-back for ten percent shareholders on trades within any six
month period. Hedge funds that trade quickly are careful to avoid the
trigger.
The limitation on supply of stock that an investor can borrow also
creates a market based self-correction mechanism. The investor must pay
for the privilege of enjoying the economic incentive to abstain in the price
of the rebate paid to the lender of the shares. 16 1 Those who lend stock
around record dates established for important votes understand well the risk
they are absorbing.
An investor who has held the stock and hedged is in no different
position than an investor who has sold the stock after the record date for the
shareholder vote and has not coupled a proxy with the sale. Both investors
have no economic incentive to vote and both have suffered a cost; the hedge
investor has paid the price of the hedge and the selling investor has paid a
price in the discounted value of the stock sold (the acquirer of the stock will
pay less for the stock because it comes with a voting right at the next
shareholder meeting).
The size of the rebate is related to the declining availability of
borrowed shares, the market signals sent by short interest in the stock and
the potential behavior of those who hold short positions. This last point
deserves careful mention. Those who lend stock understand well that an
investor could vote hedged shares against the economic interest of other
shareholders if the investor has a personal stake in the outcome of the vote.
An investor who buys shares and then shorts them so as to vote the shares
free of economic consequence must anticipate a profit in excess of the
rebate paid to the lender of the shares. For example, an investor may want
to keep a position on the board of directors (to protect salary) or put
incompetent relatives on the board. The risk of such an investor voting
161 An economist would note that the arbitrager has paid the stock lender for shifting the
down-side risk. The payment only makes economic sense if the arbitrager can shift the
down-side risk to those more willing to bear it (that is at a lower cost).
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shares in its own interest will be included in the rebate charged by the
lender of the shares. The risk is priced accordingly to the likelihood of the
strategy's success and size of its cost. This is one of the reasons that
borrowed shares will "go special" around shareholder votes and the rebates
charged on loaned shares increase. Note, however, that the increase in
rebates around share record dates, although significant are still relatively
small, reflecting the market participants view that the risks of self-interested
behavior are, on average, slight. Those who lend stock around record dates
understand and price the risk.1
62
In sum, the combination of the cost of the short position and the
offset voting interest of other shareholders means that the hedging strategy
around record dates is inherently very limited in its effectiveness for anyone
seeking a personal benefit, unshared with other shareholders (or the firm).
The most likely use of the technique will occur when an investor is
convinced that the investor is correct on its assessment of how to vote to
increase share value (or firm value), worried about others holding a flawed
view of the future, and is willing to purchase a hedged position to increase
its voting power to aid, not hurt the company.
A combination of risk arbitrage and hedging positions taken during
takeovers that involve shareholder votes is a special case of the hedging
discussion noted above. Indeed, the situation is less poignant perhaps
because the opportunity to do risk arbitrage is more available than the
opportunity to secure a board seat. For example, all shareholders in Mylan
could, in theory, engage in deal risk arbitrage, directly or through an
intermediary, once the deal had been announced. Again, the market self-
corrects for such situations in the price changed for borrowing the shares.
The price Perry Corp. had to pay for its short positions no doubt rose
steadily, reflecting that the stock had gone special and that borrowers were
changing special fees for loaning shares and accepting the down-side risk.
Moreover, there was plenty of active voting interest in the Mylan stock by
other shareholders. Perry Corp.'s trading strategy was not stimulated by a
desire to steal a step on other shareholders. Perry's strategy was aimed at
neutralizing the announced voting position of Mr. Icahn, who appeared after
Perry Corp. had established its arbitrage position. We should let the market
participants "duke it out" in such cases and not try to establish rules against
shorting to buy votes.
In practice, when hedge funds short shares to hedge the effects of a
vote on a long position, the fees charged are small because lenders believe,
correctly, in all but isolated cases, that the funds will vote in the firm's
interest, not against it, and that the funds just have a stronger incentive than
the share owner/lenders to do so, given the funds' leveraged stake. It is the
162 Again, an economist would say that the payment only makes economic sense if the
investor can shift the risk to someone more willing to bear it.
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interests of the lenders that internalize the economic costs of voting the
shares in the hands of the hedged owner.
VI. LEVERAGE: DIRECT REGULATION IN NOT THE ANSWER BUT
INDIRECT REGULATION IS NECESSARY
Most hedge funds are heavily leveraged. 163  In essence, a fund
increases its returns on deployed capital by using borrowed money
alongside its own 16 4 or by using various derivative contracts rather than
holding the underlying securities. 165 The amount of leverage used by a
hedge fund depends on its investment strategy; arbitrage funds are more
likely to use heavy leverage than activist funds for example. A 1999 study
found that a majority of hedge funds were leveraged at less than two to one
but that some were leveraged at more than thirty to one.166
There are no legal limits on hedge fund leverage.1 67 Registered
investment companies, mutual funds, on the other hand, may use leverage
but they operate under direct limits. 16 s  An open-end mutual fund, for
example, must borrow only from a bank and is subject to a 300 percent
163 See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE
FUNDS, LEVERAGE AND THE LESSON OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 11 (1999),
available at http://www.mfainfo.org/images/pdf/PWG1999.pdf.
164 Generally speaking, leverage is the use of financial instruments or borrowed capital
to increase the potential return of an investment. Typically, financial leverage takes the
form of a loan that is reinvested with the hope of earning a rate of return that is greater
than the cost of interest. Therefore, the use of leverage creates the possibility of higher
returns for the investor than would otherwise be available. However, the potential for
significant loss is also greater because, if the investment fails, the investor loses his or
her money and also must repay the loan. Thus, the use of leverage magnifies the
potential for gains and losses. See lnvestopedia.com, Leverage,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/leverage.asp (last visited June 15, 2006).
165 In a repurchase agreement ("repo"), for example, one side sells a security (often a
United States Treasury obligation) at a specified price coupled with a simultaneous
agreement to buy back the security on a specified future date, usually at a fixed or
determinable price. Both sides are leveraged to changes in market prices that cause the
replacement value of the transactions to rise above their value at inception. See
Investopedia.com, Repurchase Agreement - Repo, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/repurchaseagreement.asp (last visited June 15, 2006). Many "funds of hedge
funds" provide limited liquidity to their shareholders by offering to repurchase their
securities twice per year. These repurchase agreements are made following tender
offers in compliance with Rule 13e-4 of the Securities Exchange Act and Section
23(c)(2) of the Investment Company Act. See SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra
note 28, at 71.
166 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
163, at 5.
167 Id at 3 (Hedge funds were exempt from regulatory restrictions on leverage or trading
strategies.).
168 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)-(g) (2000).
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asset coverage test.169  Closed-end investment companies have less
restrictive limits.' 70 All investment companies may invest in derivatives
that are inherently leveraged only if the company "covers" the transaction
by setting aside liquid assets in an amount equal to the potential liability or
exposure created by the transaction. 171
Any limits on a hedge fund's use of leverage come from the market
discipline provided by creditors and counterparties. 172 If a hedge fund takes
substantial risks its creditors should respond by increasing interest rates or
reducing the availability of credit to the firm. 173 Counterparty discipline
comes through increased credit terms either directly, through trading, credit
limits or initial margin, or indirectly, through credit spreads on
transactions. 174  Moreover, lenders and counterparties themselves are
subject to legal limits on risk exposure. Legal regulations affect the
potential lenders and counterparties of hedge funds.
Hedge funds can create leverage by borrowing funds or by
engaging in derivative175 transactions with counterparties. 17  When
borrowing money, lenders are subject to specific limits. A broker-dealer
extending credit to a hedge fund must comply with the margin requirements
in Regulation T issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. 177 Additional "maintenance margin" requirements are imposed by
self-regulatory organizations. 18 Banks loaning money to hedge funds must
comply with general limits under federal treasury regulations. An FDIC
169 id.
170 Id. (A closed-end company may issue a senior security that is a stock (preferred
stock) if it maintains asset coverage of at least two hundred percent).
171 See Dreyfus Strategic Investing & Dreyfus Strategic Income, SEC No-Action Letter,
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,472 (June 22, 1987) (modifying
Securities Trading Practice of Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company
Act Release No. 10,666, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 48,525 (April 18, 1979) (the "senior
security transaction" requirements)).
172 E.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra
note 163, at 5 (Hedge funds are limited in their use of leverage only by the willingness
of creditors and counterparties to extend such leverage.); id at 25 ("The primary
mechanism that regulates risk-taking by firms in a market economy is the market
discipline provided by creditors, counterparties (including financial contract
counterparties), and investors.").
173 I. at 25.
174 id.
175 Derivatives are financial instruments with values tied to the performance of assets
(usually stocks or bonds) or to benchmarks (usually interest rates). A plain vanilla
derivative instrument is a future an agreement to buy or sell a specific commodity or
financial instrument at a set price on a stipulated date.
176 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
163, at 5.177 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-.12 (2006).
171 See, e.g., NASDAQ, Inc., NASD Rule 2520 (c)-(d) (2006); NYSE, Inc., NYSE Rule
43 1(c)-(d) (2006).
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insured bank, for example, may not make a loan of more than fifteen
percent of its asset value to any one borrower.' 9 More importantly, banks
are subject to minimum capital requirements based on the risk
characteristics of their assets, which include loans to and transactions with
hedge funds.180 Finally, bank supervisors monitor individual banks lending
activities for risk appetite and risk management."'
A 1999 government study after the collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) Fund found, however, that bank lending to hedge
funds was acceptable.18 2  The LTCM Fund bankruptcy itself did not
threaten the solvency of any United States commercial bank, although a
LTCM liquidation could have significantly reduced quarterly earnings.1
3
The 1999 government study found only that banks have given the fund
credit terms that were too favorable given the funds high risk and that banks
needed to tighten up with credit risk management systems.
Most bank exposure to hedge funds occurs from counterparty
trading and other derivative activities. 1 4 Banks take the opposite side of
swap transactions on currency or interest rates, for example. Counterparties
manage their risk exposure to hedge funds through due diligence, collateral,
credit limits, reporting requirements, and monitoring.18 5 Banks establish
risk profiles they are willing to undertake and develop risk management
179 12 CFR § 32.3(a) (2006). A bank may loan an additional ten percent of its capital to
one borrower if the additional portion is secured by "readily marketable collateral."
Generally marketable collateral is anything that is fairly liquid or exchange traded. 12
CFR § 32.2(n) (2006). If a bank lends against secured United States Treasury bonds as
collateral the amount does not count against the percentage limits. Id.
180 The basic risk-capital regulations are contained in the 1988 Basel Capital Accord.
While the 1988 standards do not break out high risk assets, such as loans to hedge
funds, the new amendments to the Basel Accords will. See generally Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving
Forward, Looking Back (Jan. 14, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/fyi/2003/011403fyi.html.
181 In January 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a set
of recommendations on managing counterparty credit risks to hedge funds. Soon after
the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Treasury Department, and a group of twelve major
banks formed a Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRPG) that issued its
own recommendations. See COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP,
IMPROVING COUNTERPARTY RISIK MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (1999), available at http://
www.mfainfo.org/washington/derivatives/Improving / 20Counterparty / 20risk.pdf.
The BCBS recommendations are incorporated into Federal Reserve supervisory
guidance and examination procedures.
182 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
163, at D-1. The Working Group found that as of September 30, 1998, the aggregate
bank direct lending exposure to hedge funds was less than $4.3 billion at twelve banks
identified to have hedge fund relationships. Id. The banks had total assets of more than
$2.6 trillion. Id.
183 Id at D-12.184 Id. at D-1.
185 Id at 7.
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procedures.186 Bank examiners supervise the safety and soundness of the
bank's activities. "' The LTCM failure led the OCC to issue new
supplemental guidance for examiners in reviews of banks that act as
counterparties to hedge funds.'88 A default by LTCM would have cost its
top seventeen counterparties, for example, between $3 billion and $5 billion
in losses. 189 Again, however, the 1999 government study found that
aggregate bank counterpart exposure to hedge funds was within acceptable
parameters. 90  The LTCM failure has led banks to tighten up their
calculations of derivative and foreign exchange exposure. 91
Concern over "excessive" leverage by hedge funds, however, is
likely to lead to the heaviest pressure for new regulations for hedge
funds. 192  Discussions of any direct regulation of hedge fund leverage
usually collapse when the participants get to the details. Balance-sheet
leverage is not an adequate measure of risk1 93 and would encourage
avoidance behavior with off-balance sheet strategies. Alternatives such as
"value-at-risk" (a ratio of potential gains and loss) to net worth offer more
meaningful measures of risk but have severe measurement problems.
1 94
Any attempt to directly regulate leverage would likely be conservative, due
to measurement problems, and put significant limits on hedge funds' ability
to provide market liquidity. Direct regulation could also increase moral
hazard costs as lenders and counterparties may relax their vigilance in
reliance on the government rules.
So discussants move on to a familiar back-up regulatory system,
mandatory disclosure. Here is where the pressure will grow on the SEC to
augment its new higher profile in hedge fund regulation. Rules should
186 See generally id. at D-1 to -10.
187 Id. at D-1 to -2; see also id. at D-2 (Examiners may assess the "level and direction of
risk", the "quality of risk management", as well as "risk profiles for various product
offerings, business lines or activities...").
188 See, e.g., O.C.C. Bulletin 99-2: Risk Management of Financial Derivatives and Bank
Trading Activities (Jan. 25, 1999), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
bulletin/99-2.txt; REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL
MARKETS, supra note 163, D-2 n.2 (further sources of information).
189 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
163, at 17. The real danger was in the market disruption that would have been caused
by the counterparty's efforts to limit their exposure by liquidating or covering their
positions. There would have been significant movements in market prices and could
have been a severe market liquidity crunch. Id. at 19-20.
190 Id. at D-1. The Working Group found that hedge fund trading activating with money
center banks represented less than four percent of the total $27 trillion in total notional
value of derivative contracts at the institutions. Id.
191 Id. at D-13 to -14.
192 Id. at 29 ("The central public policy issue raised by the LTCM episode is how to
constrain excessive leverage more effectively.").
193 Id. at 24 (the numbers do not reflect market, credit and liquidity risks).
194 See id (Problems include "faulty or incomplete modeling assumptions" or "narrow
time horizons.").
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force hedge funds to disclose additional information, they argue. 195 A
"database" of hedge fund activity was the controversial suggestion of the
President's Working Group on LTCM. 19 6 The disclosure proposals all stem
from the same finding that lenders and counterparties to LTCM had badly
underestimated the risk of LTCM activities. Loans and transactions with
LTCM had been under priced. Had lenders and counterparties held a more
accurate view of the risk of dealing with LTCM, they would have charged
more for loans and increased the spread on counterparty transactions. The
increased charges would have limited LTCM's ability to engage in risky
trading. LTCM took advantage of cheap money.
The strongest database proposals require disclosure to the public.
The President's Working Group on LTCM made such a recommendation.' 9
Various alternatives for a public database have been discussed since the
1999 Report. The alternatives include a fully public database, a system in
which hedge funds submit position information to an authority that
aggregates the information and reveals it to the market, and a database
maintained by regulators on a confidential basis.1 98
Milder proposals require private mandatory disclosure of specified
information only to lenders or counterparties. The least intrusive disclosure
proposals are indirect, acting not on hedge funds but on their counterparties
and lenders, and require publicly-traded financial institutions that deal with
hedge funds to disclose a summary of direct material exposures to all
significantly leveraged financial institutions. The Working Group made
both of these suggestions as well.199 The disclosure requirements of the
publicly-traded lenders and counterparties would require that such
companies make information demands on hedge funds necessary to gather
the data required.
The case has not been made for the mandatory disclosure direct
regulation, requiring hedge fund disclosures either to the public or to
enforcement agencies or to lenders and counterparties. However, indirect
regulation, fine tuning the mandatory disclosure rules that act on lenders
and counterparties of hedge funds, is necessary. The argument in support
below begins with a description of market based responses to hedge fund
risk that diminish the need for any direct regulation of hedge funds and
195 Id. at 31 (The Working Group sees the need for "public companies, including
financial institutions, [to] publicly disclose additional information about their material
financial exposures to significantly leverage institutions, including hedge funds.").
196 Id. at 32. For criticism of this part of the Report, see The Financial Economists
Roundtable, Statement on Long-Term Capital Management and the Report of the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets (Oct. 6, 1999), available at
http://www.luc.edu/finrountable/statement99.html.
197 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
163, at 32.
198 Bernanke, supra note 78.
199 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
163, at 33 34.
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concludes with a discussion of the need for some form of indirect
regulation.
A current assessment of hedge fund leverage and its risk to our
financial system comes from the speeches of Timothy F. Geithner, the
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. In a speech on November 17, 2004, he made several observations
about the advances of our financial system since the collapse of LTCM in
1998.20 First, the number of hedge funds and the total assets under
management has increased dramatically since 1998. Second, exposure of
lender and counterparties to hedge funds is more diversified than in 1998.
Third, lenders to and counterparties of hedge funds have significantly
improved the quality of their risk management since 1998. Fourth, the
capital in banks measured relative to their risk has stayed the same. And
fifth, the infrastructure of our trading system, its clearing and settlement
systems, is much stronger and more resilient than it was in 1998. In other
words, market participants have responded to the LTCM crisis with market
based corrections.
However, Geithner went on to suggest that there is room for further
improvement in risk management assessment by banks and counterparties
given the ever changing nature of hedge fund activities. 20 1 He also noted
some "erosion" of standards in response to competitive pressures.202
Geithner's final recommendation is a reminder of how market forces work.
He recommended that those dealing with hedge funds need a better due
diligence process, demanding information from hedge funds on the nature
and quality of their operations.
To the extent that information is not made available, and
there seem to be a number of legitimate reasons why
hedge funds may resist providing it and are sometimes
successful in doing so, then it makes sense for the dealer
to reduce the exposure it is willing to take to that fund.
In general, credit terms should be calibrated to the quality
of the information provided by the hedge fund
counterparty. To the extent this is done is generally
across those funds that are less transparent, have weak
risk management disciplines and/or inadequate
operational infrastructure, they will be able to take on
less leverage, which would limit the potential risk they
may pose in a disruptive event.2 °3
200 See Geithner, supra note 37.
201 Id. at 3.
202 Id. at 4.
203 Id. at3.
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Geithner has, in later speeches, continued to encourage banks to
develop new methods of risk management for hedge fund clients0 4 and for
the new derivative products often traded by hedge funds (specifically credit
205derivatives). In his speech on credit derivatives, to the dismay of some
hedge funds, he encouraged banks to "take a cold, hard look at [increasing]
financing conditions and margin practice particularly with respect to hedge
fund counterparties.' 20 6  In essence, Mr. Geithner's talks demonstrate a
market that is adjusting successfully for hedge fund trading.
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, has
concerns about the practical implementation of a public database proposal:
I understand the concerns that motivate these proposals but,
at this point, remain skeptical about their utility in practice.
To measure liquidity risks accurately, the authorities would
need data from all major financial market participants, not
just hedge funds. As a practical matter, could the
authorities collect such an enormous quantity of highly
sensitive information in sufficient detail and with sufficient
frequency (daily, at least) to be effectively informed about
liquidity risk in particular market segments? How would
the authorities use the information? Would they have the
authority to direct hedge funds or other large financial
institutions to reduce positions? If several funds had
similar positions, how would authorities avoid giving a
competitive advantage to one fund over another in using
the information from the database? Perhaps most
important, would counterparties relax their vigilance if they
thought the authorities were monitoring and constraining
hedge funds' risk-taking? A risk of any prescriptive
regulatory regime is that, by creating moral hazard in the
marketplace, it leaves the system less rather than more
stable.
A system in which hedge funds and other highly leveraged
market participants submit position information to an
authority that aggregates that information and reveals it to
the market would probably not be able to address the
concern about liquidity risk. Protection of proprietary
information would require so much aggregation that the
204 Geithner, supra note 38.
205 Timothy F. Geithner, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks at
the NYU Stern School of Business Third Credit Risk Conference, NYC: Implications of
Growth in Credit Derivatives for Financial Stability (May 16, 2006), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/geiO6O516.html.
206 Id. at 4.
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value of the information to market participants would be
substantially reduced. Timeliness of the data would also be
an issue.
A public database of nonproprietary information could
provide the public with a general picture of hedge-fund
activity without creating the false impression that the
authorities were engaged in prudential oversight of hedge
funds. Such a public database might demystify hedge
funds, but it would not address the central policy concern
that opacity creates liquidity risk.20 7
However, indirect regulation, the regulation of financial institutions
that deal with hedge funds, does make sense. I have already noted the
capital adequacy requirements for banks that deal with hedge funds. 208 This
is a form of indirect regulation on hedge fund activity through the
regulation of those that deal with hedge funds. Our banking system is
designed to guard against bank failures. We have decided that we do not
want banks to fail; individual depositors need protection and the risk of
system wide contagion from any one bank failure is too great. Hedge fund
failures, on the other hand, are a normal and expected part of the hedge fund
business. With banks competing to deal with hedge funds, some banks,
responding to competitive pressure, could agree to financial terms that
jeopardize their solvency. 20 9  To protect against bank failures, the
government establishes minimum levels of acceptable risk that apply to all
banks. Bank capital adequacy rules and the examiner system are designed
to establish a floor on bank risk.21 0
Another form of indirect regulation on hedge fund activity could be
a disclosure rule that requires all public companies, particularly those that
are financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies, to include
a summary of their direct material exposure to hedge funds and other
207 Bernanke, supra note 78, at 5.
208 See discussion, p.25.
209 Both Geithner and Bernanke expressed concern over the "erosion in [bank]
standards" in response to competitive pressures, reflected in a lowering of initial margin
requirements and a relaxation in credit terms for hedge funds. See supra notes 37, 38,
and 78 and accompanying text.
210 The SEC's regulation of securities firms and the CFTC's regulation of commodity
futures merchants pose the same basic problem. The SEC and the CFTC are responses
for ensuring that these firms, when they deal with hedge funds, follow prudential risk
management practices in their counterparty and credit relationships. See REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 163, at 34.
Chairman Bernanke is worried about the risk management practices of "prime brokers,"
broker-dealer firms that provide financing, back-office accounting, trade execution and
clearing and settlement services for hedge funds. See Bernanke, supra note 78, at 3.
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significantly leveraged financial institutions. 211  Such a rule would be
designed to protect the investors of public companies. We have decided
that the investors of public companies deserve specific, detailed information
in periodic reports. It would be a corruption of the requirement to permit
such companies to invest in privately-held companies, hedge funds, and
then not reveal the details of their investments. It is a regulatory problem
similar to the regulation of banks in the sense that when a more heavily
regulated entity invests in a lightly regulated entity the regulated entity
should not, by such investing, escape or modify its regulatory obligations.
The present SEC rules do not provide specifically for disclosures
about exposure to hedge funds. SEC rules could provide for such
disclosures in the Management Discussion and Analysis (M, D, & A) or
Description of Business segments of the periodic financial statements.
Such disclosure would be consistent with existing SEC financial disclosure
philosophy. 212 Investors of publicly-traded companies ought to have all
material information disclosed in ways are meaningful to intelligent
investors. After LTCM, and with the continued notoriety of leveraged
hedge funds, some disclosure of exposure to hedge funds, if significantly
leveraged, would seem to be a needed evolution of current disclosure
practice.
A special case of the indirect regulation through disclosure
requirements acting on financial intermediaries that deal with hedge funds
is the "fund of hedge funds" or "retailization" controversy. The SEC has
long been concerned with those investment funds that invest in hedge
funds, the funds of funds. FOFs "typically invest in fifteen to twenty-five
funds., 21 3 They come in three forms, defined by their registration status.
Some are not registered as investment companies under the Investment
214Company Act of 1940 and privately place their securities. Some FOFs
are registered as investment companies under the 1940 Act and privately
place their securities.215 Some FOFs are registered as investment
companies and also register their offering of securities to investors under
the 1933 Act.216 Most FOFs, even those with interests registered as public
211
offerings under the 1933 Act, are offered only to institutional investors.
A few new FOF mutual funds have been be offered to the public,
however. 21 8  All investment advisers to FOFs registered as investment
211 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note
163, at 33.
212 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 200 (2006).
213 SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra note 28, at 67.
214 ld. at 68.
215 Id. ("40 Act only Registered").
216 Id. ("dual registered").
2 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,057 (Dec. 10, 2004).
218 Approximately 52 hedge funds offered or planned to offer shares to the public as of
2004. Id.
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companies must also register under the Investment Advisers Act. 219 With
the new SEC rules, those FO1s that are not investment companies will
probably also have to register as investment advisers.22 There is no
minimum initial investment requirement for clients of FOFs with registered
investment advisers. Since FOFs typically charge a performance fee,
however, all fund investors must satisfy the definition of a "qualified client"
under SEC Rule 205-3. Rule 205-3 requires that each investor generally
have a net worth of at least $1.5 million or have at least $750,000 of assets
under management with the adviser.22'
The SEC is concerned about the quality of the FOF disclosures.
222
The first concern is about double (or even triple) fees.223 Investors in a FOF
are subject to fees and expenses at both directly, at the FOF level to the
FOF adviser, and indirectly, at the fund level to the individual fund
224
advisers. A registered FOF, for example, usually pays its investment
adviser an asset-based management fee of one or two percent of assets
under management and a performance allocation on the capital appreciation
that can be as much as twenty percent, and the underlying funds also pay
225similarly structured investment fees. Registered FOFs, however, do not
disclose the actual or estimated fees indirectly incurred by the FOF through
its investment in the underlying hedge funds. 6 The SEC wants investors
in registered FOFs to be informed of the layered fee arrangements.
27
219 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1 (2005).
220 See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed.
Reg. 72,054, 72,071 (Dec. 10, 2004). (Advisers to a FOF must look-through the "top
tier" hedge fund to count its investors as clients for the purposes of meeting the private
adviser exception.) The threshold of fourteen clients would likely be exceeded, thus
requiring registration as an Investment Adviser.
221 With the new rules, a private hedge fund that has a FOF investor must look through
the FOF and count its investors are clients for the purpose of meeting the fourteen client
threshold. A FOF investor then means most all the underlying funds will have to
register under the Advisers Act.
222 SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra note 28, at 99 ("The staff believes that
disclosure of the expenses of both the fund in which the investor invests and the funds
in which a fund of funds invests is important to provide meaningful information to
investors.").
223 Id. at 100 (expressing a concern over the lack of any limit on the amount of fees that
may be charged by hedge fund advisers).
224 Thus, an investor may incur indirect fees at the level of the individual hedge fund
regardless of whether the fund of funds performed poorly. Id.
225 Id. at ix.
22' Form N-22, 17 C.F.R. § 274.1 la-] (2005) (Registration Statement of closed end
management investment companies).
227 See SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra note 28, at 99; see also Fund of Funds
Investments, Investment Company Act Release No. 33-8297, (June 23, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8297.htm (proposing an amendment to Form
N-2).
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The second concern with FOF disclosures is the transparency of
the funds' investment positions. 228  A registered FOF must disclose, in
semiannual shareholder reports, the fund's financial statements and
portfolio holdings. 229 Registered FOFs fulfill this disclosure obligation by
listing hedge funds in which the registered FOF has invested, but they do
not identify the securities in which the underlying hedge funds have
invested.230 Registered FOFs must also disclose valuation information on
their positions in underlying hedge funds and the FOF's general investment
strategy z.2 3  The valuation disclosures will necessarily reveal general
information about the underlying hedge funds' portfolios. The SEC has
stopped short of mandating specific valuation procedures but is soon to
232require that FOFs have valuation procedures in place z.
There appears to be an upcoming clash between hedge funds who
want their trading strategies to remain confidential and the SEC who, when
a FOF is marketed generally, want a FOF to disclose to its investors more
details about the practices and portfolio of the underlying funds. The push
to regulate FOFs may be the backdoor method of forcing hedge funds to
make more public disclosures about their trading positions and portfolios.
VII. RELAXING THE REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUNDS
The staff of the SEC, in its September 2003 Report on hedge funds,
ended by suggesting that the SEC explore enabling registered investment
233
companies, mutual funds, to use some hedge fund strategies.. The
suggestion was a good one, but it does not appear that the SEC will act on
it. The staff noted that hedge funds had more freedom to short the
market,234 engage in more leverage, 23  and use more innovative
236
organizational structures 3. Discussions of the advantages of hedge fund
short selling and leverage are noted above.237  The third category,
organization structure, deserves separate mention. The staff noted the many
organizational features used by hedge funds that may not be used by
238investment companies.
228 SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra note 28, at 81.
229 Investment Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30e-1 (2005).230 The new SEC rules forcing more of the underlying hedge funds to register under the
Investment Advisers Act will provide only very general information on those funds'
investment practices and portfolio securities.
231 SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra note 28, at 71.232 See id at 99.
233 Id. at 103-113.
234 Id. at 107.
235 id.
2361 d. at 104-106.
237 See discussion, pp. 15-18, 26-28.
238 SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra note 28, at 104-106.
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The "lock-up" used by hedge funds are prohibited to open-end
investment companies that must hone redemption requests within seven
days.239 Open-ended investment companies may hold no more than fifteen
percent of their assets in illiquid securities. 240  Closed-end investment
companies, on the other hand, do not issue redeemable securities and may
hold illiquid securities, but cannot engage in continuous offerings and often
241have trouble raising additional assets. Most significantly, investment
advisers to investment companies may not charge an investment company a
performance fee. 42 Hedge funds rely heavily on performance fees, up to
twenty percent of a fund's capital gains and appreciation, to provide fund
advisers incentives to produce absolute returns to the fund . 3
The restrictions on investment company short selling, leverage and
organizational structure create a substantial disincentive for such companies
to engage in so-called "absolute return" investment strategies, strategies that
are independent of the aggregate value of the market. Most investment
companies, on the other hand, buy and hold types of securities and their
returns are judged by whether they best a passive benchmark index.244
Mutual funds that want to engage in "absolute return" strategies must be
FOFs, holding a portfolio of hedge funds. All but a very few of such FOFs
24
are available only to institutional or wealthy investors.  Other countries
give their investment companies more trading freedom. 46  To stay
competitive in the global financial markets, we need to reassess whether the
trading restrictions on our mutual funds, investment companies, make sense
in the modern markets.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The irony of the hedge fund regulation movement is that financial
economists have, for over seventy years, been decrying, first, the lack of
independent shareholder involvement in the management of public firms
and, second, the lack of swift capital reallocation in American industry.
Hedge funds do both, more effectively than any financial institutions in
American history perhaps, and we should not recoil in fear over the
innovation. Hedge funds are a competitive advantage in the world's
239 Id. at 105.
240 ldat 105, n.333.
241 Id. at 105-106.
242 Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2000).
243 SEC STAFF REPORT TO THE SEC, supra note 28, at 109.
244 Id. at 36.
245 Supra note 175.
246 See Financial Services Authority, Hedge funds and the FSA 21-22 (Discussion Paper
No. 16, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/hubs/programs/
Annual0313.01.pdf (discussing Hong Kong, Singapore and Switzerland).
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markets; we should not act to stifle them. Trading markets controlled to be
comfortable are markets that are sucked of their social value.
The lesson of hedge funds may be the reverse of the critics' claims.
They have identified a regulatory gap in operating freedom afforded
between hedge funds and that afforded registered investment companies. To
close the gap we should not reduce the trading freedom of hedge funds but
increase the trading freedom of registered investment companies
(particularly on short selling). Some regulatory fine tuning for hedge funds
is necessary, but it is indirect, involving rules operating on those regulated
entities that deal with hedge funds - banks and publicly traded financial
institutions - to protect the integrity of their regulatory systems.
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IX. ADDENDUM
After the article was written, a panel of the United States Court of
241Appeals for the District of Columbia decided the Goldstein v. SEC case.
In an opinion by Judge Randolph, the court held that the SEC rules
requiring hedge funds to register under the Investment Advisors Act of
1940 were "completely arbitrary.,' 248 The court vacated the rules.
The court was troubled by the SEC's argument that "client" meant
one thing when determining to whom an adviser owed fiduciary duties (to
the fund itself) and another when determining whether an investment
adviser must register under the act (the investors and the fund are clients).
Moreover, the court held that the SEC policy arguments for the rule,
focusing on the national scope of hedge funds, did not justify registration
based on number of clients:
The number of investors in a hedge fund ... reveals nothing
about the scale or scope of the fund's activities. It is the
volume of assets under management or the extent of
indebtedness of a hedge fund or other such financial
metrics that determine a fund's importance to national
markets.
249
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, in response to the decision, asked
the staff to prepare a "set of alternatives for our consideration.', 5 ° The SEC
could appeal the decision, rewrite its rules to satisfy the court's concerns, or
seek an amendment to the Investment Advisers Act from Congress. The
new rules or a new amendment may impose more searching regulations
than those contained in the voided rules. If so, the hedge fund industry may
view this as a Pyrrhic victory.
I am surprised by the court's opinion because it does not accept the
SEC argument for a bright-line test for hedge fund regulation. Even though
I do not favor the policy judgments behind the new rule I do not believe
them to be "arbitrary." The SEC is using a client rule as a surrogate for
catching most large hedge funds. A test dependent on the size of hedge
fund assets under management would have substantial measurement
problems at the margin and necessarily be arbitrary at the margin as well.
The SEC chose a test that catches most of the funds it wants to catch and
247 Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 15760 (D.C. Circuit June
23, 2006) (Randolph, J.).
248 Id. at *7.
249 id.
251 Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Phillip Goldstein, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, (June
23, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-101.hitm.
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the court rejected the test. A better test is possible, the court noted. This is,
of course, most always the case for any given regulatory rule and this open-
ended standard for court rejection may let the court be "arbitrary" in what
rules it will vacate. The court showed very little deference to the SEC here.
It is a signal that the SEC is short on its political capital with the D.C.
Circuit perhaps.
